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The Canol Project, 1942-45 
1992  is  the  50th  anniversary of diverse military activities, 
including the Canol Project, in northwestern Canada initiated 
by the United States War Department as defence measures 
during World War II. It seems appropriate, then, to mark the 
Canol Project’s “birthday” with a profile of its accomplish- 
ments for the oil industry. Then, as now, public attention 
focused on certain wartime projects - primarily the Alaska 
Highway - while neglecting others. Except for the fact that 
the press dramatized the difficulty in constructing a mountain 
pipeline, the Canol Project is among the least known episodes 
of the war years in Canada. Yet Canol’s contribution to the 
advance of oil exploration and development in the Mackenzie 
Basin is one of the significant events of the time. 
In August 1940, before the U.S. entered World War II, 
Prime  Minister  Mackenzie  King and President  Franklin D. 
Roosevelt met in Ogdensburg, New York, to decide upon 
future defence collaboration. Their agreement was the basis 
for U.S. military activities in Canada that began as soon as the 
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Mean- 
while, President Roosevelt had negotiated a deal to supply the 
Soviet Union with thousands of fighter  planes  on  a  “lend- 
lease” basis. These aircraft would fly to Siberia by way of 
Alaska, using an air route through northwestern Canada. As 
soon as the U.S. declared war, American aircraft converged on 
the region to transport men and materials to Alaska and to pre- 
pare the way for delivering the lend-lease airplanes (Dziuban, 
1959). 
Three major projects of the American military in north- 
western Canada emerged from these events: the Northwest 
Staging Route of aerodromes, from Edmonton to Whitehorse, 
for planes en route to Alaska and the U.S.S.R.; the celebrated 
Alaska Military Highway to Fairbanks, linking the staging 
route airfields; and the Canol Project, centring on the Norman 
Wells  oil  field,  the intended source of fuel  for  aircraft and 
vehicles using the staging route and the highway. Edmonton 
became  the  regional  headquarters for the  three  interlocked 
schemes, for which some 33 O00 Americans poured into the 
Northwest. 
In the original Canol orders issued 29-30 April 1942, the 
U.S. War Department authorized its Army engineers to pro- 
ceed with several operations. Chief among these were: 1) to 
arrange with Standard Oil Company of  New Jersey (parent of 
Imperial Oil Limited - IOL) to drill at least nine new  wells in 
the vicinity of Norman Wells and  to expand existing produc- 
tion and refining facilities; 2) to survey and build a crude oil 
pipeline and pumping stations by 15 September from the 
Mackenzie  River  at  Norman  Wells  to  Whitehorse,  Yukon, 
which was a staging route airfield on the highway; 3) to pro- 
vide the freighting needed for oil field and pipeline work via 
the Athabasca-Mackenzie waterway, that is, between the rail- 
head at Fort McMurray and the oil  camp, at Norman Wells; 
and 4) to erect by 1 October a refinery at Whitehorse to pro- 
cess 3000 barrels of crude oil a day. 
The project began to expand amid a confusion of purposes. 
For  example,  the  U.S.  Army  engineers  were  installing a different 
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pipeline along the railway from Skagway, Alaska, to White- 
horse. This line was to carry gasoline shipped by Standard Oil 
of California (a separate entity from Standard of  New Jersey) 
in tankers from its Los Angeles refineries. Before the end of 
the  year this Canol  Number 2, the  first of three  additional 
lines, was pumping ready-to-use fuel into Whitehorse before 
any pipe had  been laid west of Camp Canol across the river 
from Norman Wells. Plainly, this was a coup for California 
Standard,  thanks to the intervention of Harold Ickes, U.S. 
Secretary of the Interior. 
The freighting operation was also expanding. During the 
summer of 1942 a great deal of equipment, supplies, and per- 
sonnel did indeed go downriver to Norman Wells. In the fall a 
good portion of the equipment and supplies was returned to 
Edmonton, from where it was then shipped by railway to 
Peace River, the starting point of a temporary highway into the 
North. 
At the same time, the Americans were installing 7 aero- 
dromes throughout the Mackenzie Basin. The 7 later grew to 
10, then 14, and finally 15. Surveys for more aerodromes were 
progressing beyond Norman Wells into Rat Pass between the 
Mackenzie Delta and the Yukon Basin (Barry, 1979). 
Crude oil was eventually pumped through the Norman 
Wells line to Whitehorse. When parts for a refinery finally 
arrived in Whitehorse, refining also began. But the erratic 
march toward these and other  objectives shows how covert 
commercial rivalries, political infighting, and swelling ambi- 
tions were influencing work on the Canol Project. 
Canol’s first year was so rife with confusion that many 
local citizens complained. The Canadian government finally 
took action in May 1943 by posting General W.W. Foster to 
Edmonton with orders to report directly to the Privy Council 
on the activities of the Americans. General Foster’s files docu- 
ment  the  proliferation of the  Canol  Project and  the  rapid 
expansion of the Norman Wells oil field. 
Main Street, Norman Wells camp. Photo credit: Provincial Archives of 
Alberta, U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo, no. 79.120/51. 
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In 1941, Imperial Oil held 3305 acres in the Norman oil 
field. In May 1942,  an order-in-council, P.C. 4140, established 
a reservation for the Canol Project allowing  IOL to sink  wells 
anywhere  within 80 km of its  Discovery  Well  Number  1. IOL, 
as the  nominee of the U.S. government,  was to prospect  and  drill 
on  some five million acres. Less  than eight months later an 
international  treaty  was  signed  by  Canada  and  the  United 
States setting aside a still larger reserve for the  Canol  Project. 
The tract was bounded on the north by the Beaufort Sea, on 
the east by the 112th  meridian, on the south by the  60th  paral- 
lel, and  on  the  west  by  the  Yukon  border  with  Alaska.  In  March 
1943, P.C. 2447 established this enlarged reserve but  slightly 
trimmed its size by setting the eastern boundary 110 km east 
of the Mackenzie River. Canol now  had an oil reservation of 
about 500 million  acres  on  which Imperial Oil  was to be the 
only wildcatter. The American military was responsible for 
patrolling this enormous piece of Canadian territory. 
At the same time, Canadian authorities were  drawing  up 
much tougher general regulations for wildcatting  in  the  North. 
P.C. 742, of 28 January 1943, demanded higher royalties, 
increased surveillance, and more reports than ever before. It 
gave  the government of Canada  the right of seizure with  com- 
pensation and it reinforced  the  Crown’s claim to half of any 
oil locations. But  tacked  on to this order-in-council was a spe- 
cial section restricting permits to Imperial Oil, the U.S. War 
Department’s contractor. 
Two  weeks after publishing these comprehensive regula- 
tions, the  government  brought forth yet another order-in-coun- 
cil pertinent to Canol: P.C. 1 138 (12 February 1943). This 
document established within the larger reserve two substantial 
tracts to which  the  new  and  more onerous regulations explic- 
itly did not apply. One of these inner tracts, the  Peel  and  Wind 
River  neighbourhood  around  Hungry Lake, took  in  2.5 million 
acres of Yukon Territory. The other, amounting to 10.5 mil- 
lion  acres,  covered  the  lower  Mackenzie  Basin  from  the 
Carcajou  River  to  the  mouth of Thunder  River  and almost  to 
the Arctic Red River settlement. These two districts were of 
such  urgent  interest  to the American military that  Ottawa, 
invoking the all-purpose War  Measures Act, rushed off this 
peculiar  order-in-council  to  exempt  them  from the general 
wildcatting regulations just published. Consequently, neither 
permits nor  reports  were  required for prospecting and drilling 
in these two areas. 
There are contradictions in  the  record as to the  number of 
wells drilled for Canol during the next 18 months. Richard 
LeSeuer,  vice  president of Imperial Oil, in a  statement to a 
U.S. Senate Committee in the fall of 1943, claimed “thirty 
wells - approximately.” This estimate “matches  the Schedule 
of Wells (1973), which lists 33 wells drilled by that time on 
Canol’s lands. On  the other hand,  Ted Link, chief geologist at 
Norman  Wells, told an  Edmonton  newspaper that same  fall 
that there were  by  then 50 proven wells, all of them producers. 
This was about twice the number reported to the Canadian 
authorities in an internal memo of 1 December 1943, which 
recorded  only 23 wells, of which  only  21  were producers. The 
discrepancy  shocked General Foster. 
But  this  government  memo,  which  was  prepared  for the 
Privy Council  by  the Interdepartmental Panel  on Joint Defence 
Projects, calls attention to an interesting circumstance; so far 
all production was coming  from wells  on the company’s origi- 
nal lease and  was subject only to  the comparatively  easy terms 
of the old  1914 regulations. The regulations of 1921, with a 
somewhat stiffer schedule of royalties, actually’applied to only 
one of the company’s wells - Bear Island Number 1, com- 
pleted and abandoned in 1923. Despite the liberal terms first 
set out for Canol, despite the enlargement of the reserve, and 
despite exemptions for  wildcatting  and  the  waiver of general 
requirements, the producing wells were confined to the oil 
leases IOL  held  before  the war. 
Once  the initial requirements of 3000 barrels a day  seemed 
likely  to  be  met  with  ease,  the  military  revised  its  urgent 
needs.  The  stated  goal  became  20 00 barrels a day. To achieve 
this goal they considered  financing oil exploration as far as the 
Mackenzie  flowed - hence,  the  expansion of the  Canol 
reserve in 1943. 
Yet  this  change of purpose was not as sudden as might 
appear. Preparations for expansion occurred  early on. In  April 
1942, just days before the Canol  orders  were  issued  and  a 
month  before  the House of Commons  learned  that  such a pro- 
ject was  afoot, the U.S. Army Air Force dispatched seven 
bombers  equipped  with  trimetric  cameras  to  phot0graph.a 
320-km-wide belt through the Mackenzie  Basin,  beginning 
about  80 km north of Edmonton  and  ending  at the Arctic 
Ocean. Parallel flights were 48 km apart, with diagonal flights 
between the parallels at every 160 km. Additional flights 
meandered all the main rivers. Within a month some  34 000 
photographs were taken, representing 414 000 km2 of the oil 
country to be explored. The fact that most of the air photos 
were of country still under ice and snow was typical of 
American photogrammetric standards at the time, according to 
Canadian surveyor John Carroll (1947). Later, these pho- 
tographs were converted into polyconic project maps, which 
were available at the time of negotiations during  the  winter of 
1942-43 to enlarge the  Canol oil reserve. 
Some  surface  exploration  began  near  Norman  Wells in 
1942. In April 1943, Link organized 36 geologists into three- 
man  teams for a methodical  search of outcrops from the lower 
stretches of the Liard  and  North  Nahanni rivers north to Arctic 
Red River and Peel River. One party  explored  the  Nelson  and 
the Liard rivers from Fort Nelson  to Fort Simpson. 
By the end of the season they  had completed  surveys of  35 
separate areas, covering  nearly  every significant creek bed  and 
riverbank almost to Aklavik. Meanwhile,  a seismic reflection 
crew  was  working  the  muskeg across the river from Norman 
Wells and exploring  along the Mackenzie.  The efficiency with 
which the surface explorations were carried out suggests a 
campaign planned in advance on the basis of an  aerial 
overview of the  whole  terrain  and capitalizing on Ted Link’s 
intimate knowledge of conditions. 
Canol  Geological Investigations, jointly authored by G.S. 
Hume and T.A. Link (1945), is a collaboration of the 
Geological  Survey of Canada  and  Imperial  Oil  Limited. 
Accounts of major structural features of the Mackenzie Basin 
mesh  details  obtained  from  exploratory  drilling  and  explo- 
ration on the ground with those readable  from aerial photos. 
The description of the Arctic  Red  River anticline explicitly 
refers to aerial photographs. 
By the spring of 1944, political pressure in the United 
States forced the U.S. military to retreat to the position of cus- 
tomer only. Following negotiations in Ottawa, P.C. 2904, 
issued on 27 April  1944,  announced the termination of U.S. 
exploration activities in the Northwest Territories and  Yukon. 
With  the goal of establishing a “strategic oil reserve,” the gov- 
ernment of Canada  took  over  the  financing of wildcatting 
under  the Canol label. The Crown  was  now  the partner of IOL 
in oil field development, and so it remained until the end of 
the  war  in  1945.  Under the above order-in-council, the  Crown 
acquired one-third interest in IOL’s existing Norman proper- 
ties,  while  relinquishing  its  half  interest  in  Bear  Island 
Number 1. 
Two months later, another order-in-council, P.C. 5059,  30 
June 1944,  cancelled all  the regulations, reserves, and restric- 
tions pending  from 1943. Postwar exploration in the N.W.T. 
would be open to all  comers  under  completely new regula- 
tions, which henceforth would claim  no shares for the Crown. 
Still intact, however, was the partnership with Imperial Oil 
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established in the April order. Until the end, of the war,  and 
even for several months thereafter, the line between  what  was 
the Canol Project and  what  was  not  became  somewhat fuzzy. 
Altogether, from June 1942 until January 1946, when its 
drilling in the region stopped, Imperial  Oil drilled a reported 
83 wells in the Mackenzie Basin, of which 18 were on Bear 
Island.  Nearby  Goose  Island  was  likewise  punched  full  of 
holes.  An important  innovation at the time was  the directional 
well drilled under  the Mackenzie River, which  did produce oil. 
This was Imperial’s Canol  Bear Island Number  3,  spudded  15 
August 1943 and completed that October. 
Of 59  producing wells drilled during the four war  years of 
Canol’s existence, all were  development wells except  Imperial 
Canol  Goose Island Number 1, classed  as  an  extension test. 
All  but 4 of these producers were  apparently capped.  Those  4 
evidently supplied most  of the 1.6  million  barrels of oil report- 
edly  sold  to the U.S. military during  Canol days. 
Significantly, rotary rigs first appeared in  the  Norman field 
during  Canol  days so that cores could be taken for analysis. 
O.D. Boggs,  Imperial Oil’s interpreter of samples, used  wild- 
catting cores to conclude that  the  producing zone at Norman 
was 5000 acres in extent, at the  minimum.  Boggs also associ- 
ated  the field with an ancient coral reef  lying  in  the Fort Creek 
shales. This  piece of information, when published, established 
the Mackenzie Basin as  a  one-time tropics and inspired a gen- 
eration of “reef-conscious’’ geologists. 
REFERENCES AND FURTHER  READING 
BARRY, P.S.  1979.  “Punch”  Dickins and  the  origin  of  Canol’s Mackenzie air 
fields.  Arctic  32(4):366-373. 
. 1985.  The  Canol  Project: An adventure of the US.  War  Department 
in  Canada’s Northwest.  Edmonton:  Private limited edition. 
CARROLL, J. 1947. Photogrammetric mapping operations in Canada. The 
Canadian Surveyor‘9(6):7-17. 
DZIUBAN, S.W. 1959. Military relations between the United States and 
Canada, 1939-1945. Washington, D.C.: U.S.  Printing  Office. 
HUME, G.S., and LINK, T.A. 1945. Canol geological investigations in the 
Mackenzie  River  area,  Northwest  Territories and  Yukon. Ottawa:  King’s 
Printer. Department of Mines and Resources,  Mines and  Geology  Branch 
THE SCHEDULE OF WELLS. 1921-71. Northwest Territories and Yukon 
Survey  Paper 14-16. 
Territory. 11th ed. 1973. Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development/Information  Canada. 
P.S. Barry 
14322 Ravine Drive 
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada 
T5N  3M3 
